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of the evidence, and unceasing regulatory 
and public vigilance about the influence of 
funding source on the science that informs 
environmental health policy. 
Subsequent  to  submitting  this  letter,  the 
University of California, San Francisco, Program 
on Reproductive Health and the Environment 
(T.W. and P.S.) received a grant from the 
Johnson Family Foundation (S.V.) in support of a 
meeting to advance work on developing systema  tic 
and transparent methods to vet the science linking 
the environment and health. The other author 
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I commend Conrad and Becker (2011) for 
frankly discussing the criteria by which to 
judge data quality in chemical risk assess-
ment. Those criteria revolve tightly around 
financial conflict of interests. I agree with 
Conrad and Becker (2011) that indus-
try seems likely to continue to perform the 
toxicity tests in risk assessment. That is due 
to what I call the “GLP [Good Laboratory 
Practices] shield.” Industry’s compliance with 
GLP has caused many tens of thousands of 
published independent chronic toxicity stud-
ies—any of which might have determined the 
allowable “safe” daily dose of a chemical—to 
be excluded from pre  market approval risk 
assessments and substituted with financially 
conflicted, yet GLP-compliant, data from the 
chemical’s manufacturer. 
It is incomprehensible to me that Conrad 
and Becker (2011) assert that a financial con-
flict of interests should not be a criterion in 
determining the financial independence of 
researchers (and therefore the reliability of 
results). A financial conflict of interests exists 
as soon as there is a link between a researcher 
and a monetary value. It does not signify 
unethical behavior, but it does warn of that 
possibility. Scientists should be reassured—
not upset, as Conrad and Becker (2011) 
claim—if financial conflict of interests was the 
lead criteria to assess data quality. Conrad and 
Becker’s substitute criterion—disclosure of 
financial conflict of interests—becomes useless 
with their other recom  mendation to accept 
the data of financially conflicted scientists.
Conrad and Becker (2011) failed to 
mention the independent and consistent 
reviews that all but prove that sponsor  ship 
of science by the pharmaceutical industry 
produces results more financially favorable to 
them than those of financially independent 
science, and several reviews of toxicity studies 
of petrochemicals reach the same conclusion 
(Bekelman et al. 2003; Fagin et al. 1999; 
Swaen and Meijers 1988; vom Saal and 
Hughes 2005). 
Repeatedly Conrad and Becker (2011) 
urge regulators to accept GLP as a key cri-
terion determining data reliability (the 
ability to predict actual toxicities). The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) creates toxicity study 
guidelines (OECD 2011) featuring GLP, 
which are adopted worldwide by regulators. 
These OECD regulatory test protocols are 
stuck in the age of the light microscope, test 
a narrow and unrealistic portion of the dose–
response curve and relatively few end points, 
mostly fail to test toxicity during vulnera-
ble develop  ment, and kill the animals being 
tested before most diseases develop (a human 
equivalent of ~ 60 years). Society should not 
accept that the OECD GLP protocols are 
better than those developed by independent, 
curious academics. Therefore, for any com-
mon petro  chemical, readers should compare 
in depth the independent toxicity findings 
via PubMed and the OECD GLP alleged 
safe exposure level, which Conrad and Becker 
(2011) promote. 
Conrad and Becker (2011) proposed that 
industry be allowed to continue to influ-
ence research, although they would discount 
studies for which a sponsor owns the results. 
Journals seem to prefer the simplicity and 
finality of forbidding outsider control of a 
researcher’s data.
Finally, Conrad and Becker (2011) 
(compared with Becker et al. 2009) gave 
lukewarm support to traditional journal peer 
review and publication, but they continue to 
question its value, claiming instead that peer 
review by government regulatory agencies is 
of better quality. However, such a criterion 
would simply reinforce these agencies’ cur-
rent use of these financially conflicted data 
in determining risk assessment outcome. It 
would be better if risk assessment relied on 
traditional peer review, which is science’s 
most fundamental tool for ensuring reliable 
data. False-negative error is more consequen-
tial than false-positive error.
The author receives fees for advising nonprofit 
public health organizations. 
Tony Tweedale
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Sutton et al. and Tweedale both criticize our 
review (Conrad and Becker 2011) because we 
did not include industry funding of a study in 
our proposed set of criteria. Fundamentally, 
we rejected “industry funding” as a credibil-
ity criterion “because questions can also arise 
about the credibility of research by scientists 
funded by government agencies or nonprofit 
organizations” (Conrad and Becker 2011). 
We accept as a given that someone has always 
paid for scientific work and that funding 
has inherent potential to influence results, 
whether it comes from industry, environmen-
tal groups, or government. It appears that at 
least one member of Sutton et al. agrees with 
us to some degree on this point, because they 
repeatedly cite Bero (1999), who endorsed 
“establishing restrictions on sponsorship, 
regardless of its source.” 
We agree that funding bias has been 
docu  mented, at least in clinical trials for phar-
maceuticals and medical procedures, although 
as Sutton et al. note, the published literature 
does not yet appear to have systematically 
studied the issue in the field of toxicology 
or epidemiology across a broad spectrum of 
substances. (Tobacco is a unique and extreme 
case and should be recognized as such, not 
cited tendentiously as indicative of all indus-
try support of research.) The guidelines for 
routine toxicity studies are publically available 
and incorporate end points reflecting both 
input from a broad spectrum of experts and 
approval by government regulatory authori-
ties [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) 2011], and all such studies employ an 
entirely independent quality assurance pro-
gram documenting that facilities, equipment, 
personnel, methods, practices, records, and 
controls are in conformance with Good 
Laboratory Practice (GLP) requirements. 
The extent to which these features govern the 
design and conduct of toxicity studies miti-
gates funding bias to a large degree. 
In our review (Conrad and Becker 2011), 
we also noted that source of funding is often 
considered a “less significant” cause of pub-
lication bias than other causes [e.g., career 
advancement (publish or perish), personal 
advancement, status in one’s professional 
field, interest in obtaining positive results]. 
Sutton et al. attempt to show that the 
documents from ostensibly non  industry-
funded sources that we cited in our review 
(Conrad and Becker 2011) in fact diverge 
from the other source documents, but their 
effort is unconvincing. First, they quote the 
Bipartisan Policy Center’s statement that one 
should “consider sources of funding and any 
conflicts of interest” associated with a study 
(Bipartisan Policy Center 2009). But that 
is consistent with our review. We did not 
urge readers to dismiss questions of fund-
ing; rather, we stated that such questions 
“trigger application of the criteria” (Conrad 
and Becker 2011). The statement Sutton 
et al. quote from the Federation of American 
Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB; 
Brockway and Furcht 2006) is taken some-
what out of context. Brockway and Furcht 
(2006) pointed out that human-subjects 
research is a case of special concern, and they 
also addressed who should be permitted to 
participate in conducting research. But their 
larger goal was as we characterized it: given 
that “academia-industry collaborations can 
benefit society,” they proposed “voluntary 
measures that guard against research bias 
and foster transparency and accountability” 
(Brockway and Furcht 2006).
It is unclear what Sutton et al.’s solu-
tion—“application of systematic and transpar-
ent methodologies to vet the science”—would 
mean in practice when one is confronted 
with a toxicological or epidemiological study. 
We suspect that their solution would end up 
looking a lot like our criteria; for example, 
Bero (1999) noted the danger of suppres-
sion by sponsors, but our criteria 2, 3, and 7 
(Conrad and Becker 2011) all militate against 
that possibility. Bero (1999) also argued that 
“sponsored investigators should retain control 
over the publication of results, regardless of 
their outcome”—our criterion 2. Tweedale 
likewise endorses “the simplicity and finality 
of forbidding outsider control of a researcher’s 
data,” but again, that is what a sponsor has to 
accept to satisfy criterion 2. 
Sutton et al. complain that our crite-
ria would not “eliminate” bias, but we do 
not claim to do that. We claim that each of 
our criteria “either a) increases confidence 
that the sponsor or experimenter did not 
shape or skew the results or interpretation 
of an experiment; or b) enables others to 
assess independently whether such shaping 
or skewing occurred.” Our criteria allow the 
scientific evidence to speak for itself. 
Tweedale criticizes our review (Conrad 
and Becker 2011) for not proposing “financial 
conflict of interests [as] the lead criteria 
to assess data quality” and for “fail[ing] to 
mention” the funding bias issue. As to 
the former, the purpose of our review was 
to address credibility, not reliability; this is 
important because generally accepted methods 
for determining data reliability have already 
been adopted and implemented by regulatory 
agencies (European Chemicals Agency 
2009; U.S. EPA 1999). As to the latter, in 
our review (Conrad and Becker 2011) we 
stated that “critics have argued that industry-
supported work has employed methods, 
animal strains, or other test features that tend 
to miss or under  estimate adverse effects,” 
so we clearly acknowledged the under  lying 
concern, even if we did not cite Tweedale’s 
references.
Beyond conflict of interest, Tweedale 
additionally mis  charac  terizes our review 
(Conrad and Becker 2011) regarding the 
topic of GLP. We did not propose exclud-
ing any relevant study simply because it did 
not follow GLP. Consistent with established 
best practices of systematic evidence-based 
reviews, we support use of transparent, objec-
tive criteria for determining data quality and 
study reliability. Such criteria allow data 
from laboratory experiments, epidemiological 
investigations, and cutting-edge mechanistic 
research from all relevant studies, GLP and 
non-GLP, and from all investigators, regard-
less of affiliation or funding source, to be 
comprehensively and systematically reviewed, 
given appropriate weight, and integrated in a 
manner that provides a robust understanding 
of the mode of action and the potential haz-
ards and risks that exposures to a substance 
could pose. These basic principles of causal 
inference are widely endorsed and practiced 
(e.g., National Research Council 2011), 
and such analysis will reveal the strengths 
and flaws of a study, independent of study 
authorship or funding.
Tweedale ignores or misunderstands 
a) previous discourse (Becker et al. 2009, 
2010; Tyl 2009) explaining how and why 
the elements of GLP often result in greater 
weight being given to such studies, and b) the 
processes by which the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) develops test guidelines, in which 
experts around the world collaborate to for-
mulate, validate, update, and independently 
peer review OECD test guidelines (e.g., 
OECD 2008). When new end points or 